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Abstract
Previous research on the causes of domestic terrorism has tended to focus on do-
mestic determinants. Although this approach can be helpful to understand many
causes of terrorism, it implicitly disregards how the tactical choices made by similar
non-state actors elsewhere influence a group’s decision to resort to terrorist tactics.
This study argues that the adoption of terrorism among ethnic and ethnoreligious
groups results from a process of conditional emulation. Groups are more likely to
emulate the terrorist choice of others with whom they are connected by shared po-
litical grievances and spatial networks. The theory is tested on a new and original
group-level dataset of ethnic and ethnoreligious terrorism (1970 -2009) using geospa-
tial analysis and spatial econometric models. The results provide strong support for
the hypothesized mechanism leading to the diffusion of terrorism, and suggest that
emulation – more than domestic and contextual factors – substantially influences
dissidents’ tactic choice.
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Introduction
Recent terrorist attacks in Paris (2015) and Brussels (2016), carried out by returning
fighters from the war in Syria, have sparked fears of a spread of terrorism. Those attacks
showed how disenfranchised individuals could get inspired by the terrorist activities of
similar groups elsewhere, travel to conflict zones, receive training in terrorist tactics, and
conduct major attacks upon their return home (Schmidt 2016). Indeed, terrorism has
become an increasingly popular tactic among dissident groups. Terrorist attacks have
surged, globally, from an average of 1,523 attacks in the 1970s to over 13,000 attacks
in 2016 (Global Terrorism Database). Moreover, ethnic and ethnoreligious terrorism has
become the most common: in 2016, 4 of the 5 most active terrorist organizations were
linked to ethnic and ethnoreligious groups (i.e. Pashtun, Iraqi Sunni, Zaydi, and Kurds)
killing an estimated 7,283 civilians. Despite the growing popularity of terrorism, however,
not all groups engage in this tactic. The tactical choices of the above groups stand in
contrast with those of other ethnic groups fighting conflicts in Chad, Myanmar, Liberia,
and Ethiopia, who largely avoided resorting to terrorism. Why has terrorism become a
dominant tactic among some groups and not others? To what extent are the Paris and
Brussels attacks illustrative of a broader phenomenon, whereby a group’s choice to adopt
(or reject) terrorism is influenced by the tactical choices of similar groups elsewhere?
Despite a wealth of research on the causes of terrorism, existing work has not yet ade-
quately addressed the choice of terrorism by specific subnational groups and organizations.
Quantitative studies of domestic terrorism1 typically focus on the attributes of states where
terrorism emerges. Yet, this approach does not explain why countries that are similar in
many aspects (e.g. regime type, institutions, economic wealth, instability) experience very
1Domestic terrorism constitutes the vast majority of global terrorism. It is homegrown
in that the venue, main target, and perpetrators, all belong to the same country. Transna-
tional terrorism involves more than a single country, either through its victims, targets, or
perpetrators (Enders and Sandler 2012). A complete definition of terrorism is provided in
the next section.
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different levels of terrorism by ethnic and ethnoreligious groups, or why such terrorism has
become so widespread. While it may be tempting to explain domestic terrorism based solely
on attributes of the domestic context, this approach is incomplete as it disregards strategic
interdependence in non-state actors’ decision-making; that is, how the tactical choices by
one group affect the choices of other groups elsewhere. To date, only a handful of stud-
ies have examined the diffusion of terrorism, but focusing only on transnational terrorism
and on the country-level incidence of attacks (e.g. Braithwaite and Li 2007; Neumayer
and Plu¨mper 2010). Domestic terrorism, however, is not a country-wide phenomenon but
typically emerges from specific subnational communities (Nemeth, Mauslein and Stapley
2014). Thus, we still know little about why terrorism is chosen by some sub-state groups
and not others and under what conditions domestic groups respond to external incentives
and “copy” the terrorist choice of others.
This article aims to fill this gap. I present a novel argument focusing on domestic terrorism
as the product of a diffusion process whereby groups observe and emulate the tactical
choice of others whom they perceive as similar to them and as an example for their own
behavior. The tactical choices and experiences of similar ethnic groups are perceived
to (and in fact may) contain relevant information on the appropriateness of a tactical
innovation in a specific political context (Simmons and Elkins 2004). Terrorist choices
are therefore, in some sense, interdependent. But terrorism does not spread everywhere
and observing other groups’ terrorism does not automatically lead to adoption. Political
similarity between groups, especially shared political marginalization, facilitates mutual
identification and creates a feeling of common grievances. This makes a group more willing
to emulate the terrorist choice of similar groups elsewhere. Yet, for successful emulation to
occur groups also need to be capable to adopt terrorism. Geographic or network proximity
to groups who already engage in terrorism lowers the resource- and skills-constraints for
the adoption of terrorist tactics, provides logistical advantages for their use, and increases
a group’s overall perception of (terrorist) efficacy. Together, shared grievances and direct
ties between potential adopters and transmitters determine the optimal conditions for the
emulation of terrorism.
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Group-level analyses of terrorism and diffusion have so far been hampered by the lack of
available data. In this article I introduce a new and original dataset of ethnic and ethnore-
ligious terrorism, linking organizations in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to ethnic
groups in the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) database (Cederman, Min and Wimmer 2010).
This is the first actor-based global dataset on the use of terrorist tactics which identifies the
specific subnational ethnic communities from which terrorist organizations have emerged.
Using geospatial data on the geographic distance between ethnic group settlements and
non-spatial data on groups’ political status I generate measures of connectivity between all
politically relevant ethnic groups between 1970 and 2009 based on their degree of political
similarity and spatial proximity. I then examine the effect of previous adoption of terror-
ism by an ethnic group on the likelihood that other connected ethnic groups in the same
and other countries resort to terrorism and find a strong positive effect. Results from a
Bayesian spatial probit further suggest that indirect effects, or spatial feedbacks, reflecting
tactical diffusion are often more important than the direct effect of domestic attributes for
explaining the adoption of terrorist tactics. Moreover, while spatial proximity alone is in-
sufficient to account for diffusion and operates in conjunction with identification via shared
grievances, some degree of proximity to “transmitters” gives organizations a competitive
advantage for the adoption of terrorist tactics relative to purely non-relational mechanisms
based on media effects. The findings are robust across different model specifications and
estimations; when taking into account alternative diffusion mechanisms such as spillover
or competition; and while controlling for a number of exogenous external conditions and
spatially-clustered group-level factors as well as common shocks, which increase confidence
that the results are not driven by a simple common exposure.
This study contributes to research on terrorism, diffusion, and ethnic conflicts in several
important ways. By conducting the first systematic group-level analysis of the diffusion
of domestic terrorism it shows that this very common type of terrorism is often a product
of strategic emulation between groups. This contributes an alternative explanation of
domestic terrorism focused on the interdependence of groups’ tactical choices.
Second, moving beyond the conventional focus on states as relevant spatial units in conflict
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diffusion, I provide a novel, unified framework for understanding the diffusion of violent tac-
tics between non-state actors, both within and across national boundaries. This framework
identifies specific sender and receiver groups involved in diffusion dynamics and explains
why some ethnic groups engage in terrorism while others, even those in the same state or
with similar domestic circumstances, do not.
Third, the new dataset of terrorist tactics of ethnic and ethnoreligious groups, combined
with advanced spatial econometric techniques, allows testing the mechanisms of terrorism
diffusion in ways not possible before, and to identify key channels through which inter-
group diffusion occurs. This approach further improves upon existing research on conflict
diffusion as it demonstrates that non-relational and relational mechanisms of diffusion,
based respectively on ideas and direct ties, are not necessarily mutually exclusive but
complement each other in very specific ways.
Finally, this research has important implications for policy-making. Identifying the ex-
ternal causes of domestic terrorism, the groups more likely to choose terrorism, and the
mechanisms through which terrorist tactics diffuse can inform more effective policies for
countering and preventing terrorism.
The spatial dimension of domestic terrorism
Terrorism can be defined as the threat or use of violence by sub-state actors in order to
obtain a political or social goal through the intimidation of a wider audience beyond the
immediate victims (Enders and Sandler 2012). It is clear from mapping the distribution of
domestic terrorism that incidents of terrorism cluster in certain areas and are relatively rare
in others.2 The existence of such spatio-temporal clusters raises questions about the relative
effect of domestic vs. external factors as determinants of terrorism (Galton 1889). To date,
however, it remains unclear whether, and under what conditions, strategic interdependence
and diffusion can lead to the adoption of domestic (as opposed to transnational) terrorism.
2See Appendix C.
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Existing studies on the causes of domestic terrorism tend to focus on individual-level or
state-level factors and their influence on willingness and/or opportunities to engage in ter-
rorism (e.g. Krueger 2007; Asal, Brown and Schulzke 2015; Choi and Piazza 2014; Findley
and Young 2011). While very insightful, this approach is incomplete for two main reasons.
First, it generally assumes that the motivating factors for terrorism are a function of the
domestic environment. However, if we look specifically at subnational groups, such as eth-
nic groups, many of these have not resorted to terrorism even when the environment was
conducive to collective mobilization. In South America, for instance, there are many polit-
ically and economically marginalized ethnic groups3, but despite the numerous civil wars
and high levels of terrorism in the region, no organization acting on behalf of these groups
has resorted to terrorist tactics. In contrast, marginalized ethnic groups elsewhere have
resorted to terrorism, as in the case of the Kurds, Balochs, African-Americans, Bretons,
Corsicans, Moro, and Acehnese.
Second, grievances and opportunities correlate not only with terrorism but with many dif-
ferent forms of violent (and nonviolent) collective action (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug
2013). Put differently, terrorism is only one option from a broader menu of dissent tactics
and strategies. Yet, so far, there has been little attention to how decisions about specific
tactics are made in the context of alternatives. Why do groups’ tactical choices converge
on terrorism? The domestic (or closed-polity) approach de facto disregards how other ac-
tors’ choice of terrorism informs decisions about appropriate tactics through learning and
emulation effects. It also fails to address the timing of adoption. Why have some groups –
such as the French Basques, Corsicans, Baloch, and Kurds – started to use terrorism only
at a specific point in time?4 To answer these questions it is necessary to explicitly take
into account the interdependence of groups’ tactical choices and diffusion effects.
Unfortunately, there is a daunting gap in research on the actor-level diffusion of domes-
tic terrorism. While the civil war literature has long recognized diffusion dynamics, little
3E.g. indigenous groups in Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile
4The French Basques and Corsicans both started in the late 1970s, the Baloch in the
mid-2000s, the Kurds in the 1980s.
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systematic evidence exists regarding the diffusion of terrorism (Braithwaite and Chu Forth-
coming). The few existing studies of terrorism diffusion do not examine domestic terrorism5
but focus primarily on less common international terrorist events (Bove and Bo¨hmelt 2016;
Braithwaite and Li 2007; Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida 1980; Neumayer and Plu¨mper
2010). Moreover, although these studies have pioneered research on the topic, their domi-
nant focus on country linkages as possible channels of diffusion6 masks the fact that only
some groups within a country choose terrorism and others, usually the majority, do not.
Put differently, there are specific sender and receiver groups in diffusion processes. Hence,
analyzing the spread of terrorism across countries does little to clarify who are the specific
groups that use terrorism and why; or what makes some groups ostensibly unresponsive
to demonstration effects.
Existing studies have not gone far enough to unpack the subnational and transnational dy-
namics of terrorism diffusion partly because of a lack of actor-level data. My actor-based
dataset allows addressing this gap in ways not possible before. Moreover, by modeling link-
ages between sub-state groups it is possible to analyze specific mechanisms though which
actor-level diffusion occurs. Several mechanisms have been suggested, such as emulation
and competition, but these are largely left untested. As a consequence, we still lack a
theoretical and empirical framework for understanding inter-group diffusion and how the
terrorist choices by one group (or lack thereof) affect choices of other groups, in the same
country and elsewhere.
5For an excellent discussion of differences between domestic and transnational terrorism,
see Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev (2011).
6Research on civil war contagion has also focused primarily on linkages between coun-
tries (e.g. Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Maves and Braithwaite 2013; Metternich, Minhas
and Ward 2015).
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The diffusion of ethnic and ethnoreligious terrorism
Before turning to the analysis of terrorism diffusion it is important to clarify what consti-
tutes ethnic and ethnoreligious terrorism and why this type of terrorism warrants specific
attention. Organizations that adopt terrorism as a tactic to advance their political ob-
jectives have often emerged from specific subnational communities. Ethnic groups are
cultural communities based on the belief in a common ancestry and shared culture (Ceder-
man, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013, 23). Some ethnic groups, such as Sunni and Shia groups
in Iraq and Lebanon, define their ethnic identity also in relation to a particular religion; I
define these groups as ethnoreligious.7 Historically, the most common type of terrorism has
been ethnic and ethnoreligious terrorism, that is, terrorism perpetrated by organizations
which make claims on behalf of a specific ethnic or ethnoreligious group. Notable examples
of such terrorist organizations include, among others, the IRA (Irish Republican Army), the
Corsican National Liberation Front (FNLC), ETA (Basque Fatherland and Freedom), the
PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Lashkar-e-
Jhangvi, al-Qaida in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq, Ansar al Sunna, and the Taliban. Figure 1
illustrates the adoption of terrorism by ethnic and ethnoreligious groups between 1970 and
2009. The blue areas are spatial polygons representing the geographic settlements of the
groups which have adopted terrorist tactics based on the Geo-EPR data (Wucherpfennig
et al. 2011). Data on the terrorist activities of organizations claiming to represent specific
ethnic and ethnoreligious groups come from a new dataset described in the data section. It
is clear from Figure 1 that the adoption of terrorism is not random, but is concentrated in
some geographic areas while absent in others. In the next sections I develop an argument
for why and how groups choose terrorist tactics which accounts for these patterns.8
7Organizations with a religious ideology that do not make ethnic claims (e.g. al-Qaida
in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Shabaab, etc.) fall outside the scope conditions of this study.
8The theoretical argument seeks to explain the group-level, organizational decision to
adopt terrorism rather than the choices of isolated individuals. Therefore, so-called lone
wolf attacks are outside the scope of the theory.
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Figure 1: Ethnic Terrorism 1970-2009
How decisions about tactics and strategies are made
I begin by assuming that ethnic groups, and their leaders, operate in the context of un-
certainty about courses of action and of constraints on both rationality and resources
for mobilization (Checkel 2013; Lake and Rothchild 1998; Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett
2008). Specifically, when deciding whether and how to mobilize collectively, groups often
face uncertainty regarding which tactics to use and which tactics are most appropriate
and effective. Even in the presence of political or economic grievances, ethnic groups can
choose, at least in principle, among several courses of actions. For instance, they can keep
the status quo, resort to nonviolent resistance or adopt violent tactics. In addition, actors
are constrained in their ability to process information about specific tactics (Tversky and
Kahneman 1974). Gathering, elaborating, and evaluating such information can be daunt-
ing and groups may still not be able to determine the appropriateness of a given tactic to
their specific circumstances.
To overcome such uncertainty and constraints on information processing, ethnic groups
often look for examples (Simmons and Elkins 2004). Relying on the experience of others
constitutes a useful cognitive heuristic to resolve the dilemma of tactic choice. Ethnic
group leaders can infer from the prevalence of a particular tactic within the repertoire
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of other groups, or by the sheer number of adopters, that this may be the best thing to
do. This process applies also to the choice of terrorist tactics. When terrorist tactics
appear to be gaining attention and attracting participants, groups may have an incentive
to copy that tactic and capitalize on its perceived success.9 From a bounded rationality
perspective, emulation of others’ behavior is thus a very simple but useful focal point for
choosing dissent tactics.10
Yet, observing other groups’ adoption of terrorism is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for actual emulation. Increasing the availability of information about, and the visibility of,
terrorist tactics only increases the potential audience for such tactics; it does not necessarily
elicit a response from that audience (Hill, Rothchild and Cameron 1998). The spread
of terrorism can stall in the face of inattention, if others’ actions do not resonate with
the group members, or if a group perceives too high a risk. The diffusion of terrorism
through emulation is not automatic and differs from the simple spread of ideas. Terrorism
is a conflict tactic, subject to specific incentives and constraints. In particular, not all
groups that employ terrorism are regarded as relevant or compelling examples to emulate.
And not always does the behavior of other groups positively influences a group’s own
calculations of benefits to be gained and opportunities for effective terrorist action. To
understand the conditions under which terrorist emulation actually occurs it is necessary
to consider specific linkages between sender and (potential) receiver groups and how the
senders’ behavior influences recipient groups’ willingness and capability to initiate and
sustain terrorist activities.
Identification through shared grievances
As previously argued, exposure to other groups’ terrorist behavior by itself does not lead
to emulation. Information about other groups’ tactical choices fosters emulation only when
9See also Cunningham, Dahl and Fruge´ (2018, 594).
10This process applies not only to the choice of terrorism but also to specific terrorist
tactics such as bombings and suicide attacks.
9
the other group is perceived as a reference, hence as a model for a group’s own behavior. In
other words, emulation is dependent upon identification with an actor (Simmons and Elkins
2004; Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2008). The policy diffusion literature has emphasized
the importance of similarity between potential adopters and transmitters (Shipan and
Volden 2008). Among ethnic groups, the sharing of a similar political status is a key feature
that fosters mutual identification. A group’s political status is determined by the level of
group access to state power, that is, the degree to which a group is politically included
or excluded (e.g. Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013). By defining the position of an
ethnic group within the polity, political status creates visible identification points between
groups who share similar political circumstances and status, even when they live in different
states.
At the same time, not all forms of shared political status are equally conducive to emula-
tion. Groups excluded from political power, rather than groups in power, are more likely
to respond positively to the mobilization of other groups facing similar circumstances (see
also Metternich, Minhas and Ward 2015). Observing the terrorist choice of other polit-
ically excluded groups increases the domestic salience of existing structural inequalities
and contributes to transforming these into actual grievances. Following the mobilization
of similar groups elsewhere, politically excluded groups become more aware of their own
disadvantage in relation to the groups in power, realize the injustice of such a condition,
and are spurred to change the status quo based on the example of others (e.g. Kuran 1998).
An increase in the use of terrorism by excluded groups elsewhere has a twofold effect. First,
it makes group-level grievances more salient in the domestic discourse. Second, and more
importantly, it activates those grievances by providing a model for a specific tactic and
mobilization trajectory to redress them. Put differently, as terrorism becomes prevalent
within the repertoire of marginalized reference groups, members of a politically excluded
ethnic group become more likely to infer that such a tactic might be the most appropriate
to adopt. Ethnic entrepreneurs play an important role in this process. As Tilly notes
(2003: 34-35), ethnic entrepreneurs specialize in activating group identities, connecting
distinct groups and networks, and coordinating collective action. As a result, they can
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leverage the terrorist momentum produced by marginalized ethnic groups elsewhere to ac-
tivate emotions and gut responses within their own group. These gut responses are often
more effective at spurring support for terrorism than complex calculations of costs and
benefits (see also Tversky and Kahneman 1974).
I have argued that the process of mutual identification and perception of shared grievances,
which is necessary for the emulation of terrorism, is stronger when both sender and receiver
groups are disadvantaged and excluded from access to political power. This does not mean
that politically advantaged groups do not have grievances or cannot identify with others.
However, these groups’ high stakes in the status quo and the availability for them of
alternative, legal means to address potential grievances make these groups less responsive
to terrorism cascades elsewhere. This leads to heterogeneous responses among (potential)
recipients of diffusion effects. To illustrate, consider the case of ethnic groups in Iran. While
Iran is located in a so-called terrorism hot-spot, only the Kurds, Baluchis, and Arabs have
resorted to terrorism while the Persians and the Azeri have not. Similarly, in France, only
the Corsicans, Bretons, and Basques have adopted terrorism following the example of other
marginalized groups in Spain, Italy and UK, while no organization claiming to represent
the French has resorted to terrorism.
Adoption capacity and expected efficacy
The emulation of terrorism is not just influenced by identification between groups based on
shared political exclusion. Marginalized groups are not able to plan and execute terrorist
attacks at will even when inspired to do so by similar groups elsewhere (Braithwaite and
Chu, Forthcoming). The choice of terrorism is constrained by access to resources such as
weapons, personnel, training, and experience; yet, these resources are crucial for orches-
trating effective terrorist campaigns. If group leaders want to impose significant pressure
on the government and attract attention they need to maintain a certain level of activity
through organized campaigns. Failure to recruit enough members to the terrorist orga-
nization and to carry out successful attacks signals group weakness and generates high
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audience costs for the leadership. In what follows I argue that the location of reference
groups who already engage in terrorism is a very important factor that allows a group to
overcome the organizational and resource constraints surrounding the adoption of terror-
ism, and increases expected efficacy. Thus, for successful terrorist emulation to occur it
matters not only who the other groups are but also where they are.
Unlike peaceful protests and demonstrations, terrorism is a more costly and risky tactic
which requires specific skills and resources. The start-up costs of initiating a terrorist
campaign in complete isolation can be extremely high. Recently, individual incompetence
and lack of adequate training have led to the failure of several attempted terrorist attacks
in Europe and the US11. Although such terrorist incompetence saved many lives, it repre-
sented a major setback for those who planned the attacks. In contrast, some of the most
severe and damaging attacks recently occurred in Europe, such as the Paris and Brussels
attacks, were characterized by very high levels of sophistication and required the work of
munition specialists who trained in conflict zones, especially Syria.12 The terrorists them-
selves had previously travelled to Syria, where they joined the Islamic State and received
training in terrorist tactics.
The above examples illustrate the importance of resources, capabilities, and training for
conducting successful attacks. Establishing direct ties with more experienced groups that
already engage in terrorism lowers the barriers to initiating and sustaining terrorist attacks
and increases a group’s expectation of efficacy. Creating, or joining, local networks of ter-
rorist organizations facilitates knowledge transfer and learning, allows for joint training and
planning of attacks, increases the availability, supply, and exchange of weapons, personnel,
and other terrorism-specific capital; it even allows groups to forge alliances, make common
cause and launch coordinated campaigns against the state (see also Buhaug and Gleditsch
2008). Terror networks therefore operate as a crucial force multiplier by bolstering groups’
adoption potential, capabilities, efficacy, and lethality (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008). Ge-
ographic proximity is a critical component of such networks which tend to be spatially
11See Burke, The Guardian (September 15, 2017).
12See Callimachi, The New York Times (March 29, 2016).
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delimited (Asal et al. 2016; Perliger and Milton 2016; Sageman 2004). These networks,
and the consequent opportunities for successful terrorist actions, are much more difficult
to create and maintain among groups that live very far away, and the material advantages
of these networks are less likely to accrue to groups that are relatively isolated from the
other members.
Moreover, groups’ tactical choice-set is usually limited to those tactics that are immediately
accessible to them (Tilly 1978). This is especially true for non-state actors, who do not
have the same capabilities of governments and face more severe constraints on the adoption
of tactical innovations (Horowitz 2010). Some degree of geographic proximity to politically
similar groups who already engage in terrorism makes the latter a more accessible tactic,
by mitigating resource- and skills-constraints and providing means for effective terrorist
emulation.13
It may be argued that groups should be less likely to emulate terrorism if this does not
lead them to achieve their ultimate goals. The success of terrorism, however, is difficult
to define in practice. On the one hand, governments rarely make major concessions to
terrorists due to reputational concerns (Pape 2003). Terrorists, on the other hand, tend
to push alternative narratives which portray them as unyielding fighters and true believ-
ers that cannot be defeated or intimidated by a display of government military power.
Moreover, groups not only have long-term goals but also proximate goals which include
attracting public attention, recruiting members, demonstrating mobilization potential, im-
posing political costs on the government. These goals are a necessary pre-condition for the
achievement of most other goals, and studies have shown that terrorism can be effective
at achieving such proximate goals (Bapat and Zeigler 2016).
The expectation of government repression is also unlikely to deter emulation. Groups
often use terrorism precisely to provoke repression (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007).
13Focusing on the case of refugees, Schmidt (2016) highlights that radicalization to vi-
olent extremism and recruitment into terrorist groups becomes more likely where refugee
camps are in direct contact with fighters from an ongoing conflict (emphasis added).
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Moreover, ethnic entrepreneurs can leverage repression to exacerbate out-group antagonism
and persuade members of their constituency to support extreme terrorist actions. Hence,
there are benefits to be gained from terrorism provided that groups are inspired by the
example of others they identify with and able to organize effective campaigns. But effective
action depends also on the availability of resources, skills, and membership which are
facilitated by proximity to terrorist groups and local networks.
Figure 2 summarizes the general mechanism of diffusion discussed so far. Although expo-
sure to other groups’ terrorism is a necessary condition, it is insufficient, on its own, to
generate emulation. The diffusion of terrorism through emulation requires, first, a process
of mutual identification between groups based on the sharing of similar grievances. As
Figure 2 illustrates, this is more likely when both sender and receiver groups are politically
excluded. Second, groups need to be optimistic about the availability of terrorism-specific
resources and skills, which boost their capacity to effectively carry out attacks. This con-
dition is influenced by the degree of geographic proximity to groups that already adopt
terrorist tactics. However, a generic proximity to terrorism (such as the presence of a
terrorism hot-spot in the neighbourhood) will be insufficient to spur emulation. Proximity
to terrorism operates in conjunction with identification between groups through shared
political exclusion. In the absence of the latter, groups will be less likely to collectively
emulate terrorist violence despite the available opportunities.14 To illustrate, consider the
case of the indigenous groups of South America (e.g. Quechua, Indigenous People of the
Amazon, Aymara, Tupi-Guarani, etc.). This region experienced several civil wars and some
of the highest levels of terrorism ever recorded, mainly inspired by leftist ideologies. Yet,
marginalized indigenous groups did not respond positively to such violence and no organi-
zation claiming to represent these groups has resorted to terrorism. Instead, non-violent
tactics have rapidly spread among these groups to become one of their primary methods
14This is an important departure from Tobler’s First Law of Geography, according to
which“everything is related to everything else but near things are more related than distant
things”. In other words, not all terrorist choices are related; mutual identification between
politically excluded groups plays a central role in terrorist diffusion processes.
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Figure 2: Mechanism of Diffusion
of resistance (Cunningham and Sawyer 2017).
Based on the above discussion I formulate the following hypothesis:
An ethnic group is more likely to adopt terrorism when it shares a status of political
exclusion with other ethnic groups who engage in terrorism and the latter are geographically
proximate.
Data and research design
To test the hypothesis on the diffusion of terrorism I compile a new dataset, the GTD2EPR,
of ethnic and ethnoreligious terrorism from 1970 to 2009. This dataset links terrorist orga-
nizations in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) with politically relevant ethnic groups
in the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (EPR-ETH, Cederman, Min and Wimmer 2010).
To link terrorist organizations with corresponding ethnic groups I collected information on
whether organizations claim to represent a specific ethnic group, complementing the in-
formation in the Armed Conflict to Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Wucherpfennig et al.
2012) with additional research on organizations not involved in a civil war.15 This dataset
15For additional details on the coding rules and the dataset see Appendix C.
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allows me to identify the specific ethnic and ethnoreligious communities from which ter-
rorist organizations have emerged.
The dependent variable is a group-level binary indicator of terrorism, based on one or more
attacks perpetrated by organizations linked to an ethnic group per year.16 Only domestic
terrorist attacks are considered, and I exclude attacks perpetrated by ethnic organizations
in other countries.
To estimate terrorist diffusion between groups I rely on spatial regression models where a
connectivity matrix W specifies the dependence structure between all politically relevant
ethnic groups in every given year. I generate two sets of spatial weights matrices that reflect
the two different forms of connectivity presented in the theory, namely similarity based
on shared political grievances and degree of spatial proximity. To operationalize shared
political grievances I consider whether two groups share a status of political exclusion. The
EPR coding of political exclusion focuses on exclusion from access to central government.
Based on the political status of each ethnic group for every given year I construct a binary
matrix of political similarity where elements are 1 if two groups share political exclusion
and 0 otherwise. I measure geographic proximity between ethnic groups using GeoEPR,
a geo-referenced version of the EPR-ETH dataset, which encompasses information on the
specific settlement areas (polygons) of ethnic groups from 1946 to 2009. GeoEPR includes
812 group polygons and over 700 unique ethnic groups. Group polygons are not fixed but
can change over time reflecting the emergence of new countries or changing settlements
within countries. For each year from 1970 to 2009 I calculate the minimum distance
between each group polygon and all other polygons and generate a binary connectivity
matrix for each year.17
For each year the two matrices are multiplied element by element (i.e. Hadamard product)
so that each element (or weight) wijt of the final matrix represents the product of elements
16In Appendix A I discuss the appropriateness, in this study, of binary measures of
terrorism vs. attack counts.
17I have used two different thresholds to define neighbors (see below).
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wijt of the original two matrices. This interaction produces a matrix, W
Exclusion×Proximity,
which reflects the specific combination of shared political grievances and geographic prox-
imity which is posited in the theoretical argument (non-spatial and spatial weights). The
matrices are then combined into a single NT ×NT block diagonal matrix.18
To test the hypothesis that ethnic groups are more likely to adopt terrorism when similarly
excluded groups in the region also adopt terrorism, I rely on a two-pronged research design
focusing on multilevel and spatial econometric models. First, given the clustered nature
of the data, with group-years nested in groups nested in countries, I employ a series of
multilevel spatial logit models in which the intercepts vary as a function of clustered group-
and country-level variables. These models account for different forms of spatial dependence
between observations and for the variance among groups’ in terms of their susceptibility
to adopting terrorism (i.e. unit heterogeneity). Empirically, this is modeled by including
a spatial lag and by allowing the group intercepts to vary according to specific group-level
attributes conducive to terrorism.
In the multilevel models the spatial lag is obtained as the product of the weights matrix
WExclusion×Proximity, as previously defined, and a temporally lagged dependent variable
(yt−1).19 In the models I rely on two different observational spatial lags. The main difference
between them is given by the measure of geographic proximity adopted in the construction
of the W matrix. In the first case the spatial lag is calculated considering as neighbors
all politically similar (i.e. excluded) ethnic groups within a minimum distance of 200 km.
In the second case, only the politically similar groups in first-order neighbor countries are
considered, hence I exclude from the neighbors’ list all groups within the same country.
This because the observed diffusion effects could be due not only to emulation between
groups but also to the alternative mechanism of competition. However, if this mechanism
is indeed at work, it should only affect ethnic groups fighting against the same government
and possibly sharing similar audiences. The two observational spatial lags also differ in
18The results are not affected by whether or not the matrix is row-standardized, see
Appendix A.
19The dependent variable is temporally lagged to avoid simultaneity bias.
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that the one which only considers ethnic groups in neighboring countries takes the form of
a dummy variable measuring whether at least one group in the neighborhood has adopted
terrorist tactics in the previous year (rather than their weighted average or sum).
The multilevel model described above provides an important first test of terrorist diffu-
sion. However, it does not allow to fully estimate the strength of interdependence between
groups’ tactical choices and how spatial effects propagate through the groups in the system
(see also Franzese, Hays and Cook 2016). Therefore, to provide a more complete analysis
of terrorism diffusion that incorporates these important aspects I rely on a more sophisti-
cated spatial probit model, estimated by Bayesian Markov-Chain Monte Carlo (Wilhelm
and Godinho de Matos 2013; LeSage and Pace 2009) on a subset of the dataset.
The estimation of a spatial probit model represents a more complex approach. Suppose
we have the following spatial autoregressive model (SAR):20
y∗ = ρWy∗ + Xβ + ,  ∼ N(0, σ2 In) (1)
where y∗ is the continuous latent outcome variable, W is an N × N connectivity matrix
which captures the spatial interdependence between units, the parameter ρ is the coefficient
for the effects of other units’ outcome through this type of connectivity as specified in the
W matrix, X is an N × k matrix of covariates, and β is a k × 1 vector of coefficients
associated with the k covariates. In this model the latent variable is unobserved. Instead
what is observed are the binary outcomes (0, 1) as: yi = 1 if y
∗
i ≥ 0 and yi = 0 if y∗i < 0.
The reduced form of equation (1) is:
y∗ = (In − ρW)−1Xβ + (In − ρW)−1 (2)
where (In − ρW)−1 is the reduced-form error term, and where the errors are no longer
independent and identically distributed due to the spatial multiplier (In − ρW)−1. The
20For identification σ2 is set to σ
2
 = 1 for probit.
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jointly determined error terms represent a considerable estimation challenge due to the
need to compute an n-dimensional integral which becomes analytically intractable even for
relatively small n (see also Franzese, Hays and Cook 2016).
The Bayesian MCMC approach is a simulation-based method. The basic idea in Bayesian
estimation is to sample from the posterior distribution of the model parameters p(y∗, β, ρ|y)
given the data and some prior distributions for the parameters. The sampling from the
posterior distribution can be realized by a Markov Chain Monte Carlo and Gibbs sampling
scheme (Wilhelm and Godinho de Matos 2013).
The Bayesian estimator of the spatial probit introduced by Wilhelm and Godinho de
Matos (2013) follows the Bayesian Gibbs sampling approach proposed by LeSage (2013)
and LeSage and Pace (2009) with some modifications to facilitate implementation. For
computational efficiency, the spatial probit is estimated on a subset of the main dataset,
that is, two cross-sections of all ethnic groups from 1991 to 1999 and from 2000 to 2009,
where values of the dependent variable are averaged over each time period. To avoid post-
treatment bias the average values of the group-level covariates are calculated using only
the years up to the first observed terrorist attack for each ethnic group. An additional
step would be to estimate the models considering values of the dependent and independent
variables in each year. The size of data set, which has more than twenty-two thousand
observations, makes it very computationally intensive to estimate a Bayesian spatial probit
over the full dataset.
In both the multilevel and spatial probit models I consider a number of additional influences
on groups’ incentives for terrorism. In particular, I control for the non-spatial effect of
political exclusion, that is, the effect of political exclusion in the absence of diffusion (i.e.
pre-dynamic effects, Franzese, Hays and Cook 2016). While the theory posits that political
grievances are more likely to lead to terrorism when they are activated by the terrorist
choices of similar groups elsewhere, it is important to test whether exclusion by itself
is sufficient to induce terrorism. Therefore, all models include dummy variables for the
political status of ethnic groups which reflect the type and degree of political exclusion,
with included groups as reference category. I also control for the relative size of the ethnic
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group, to account for latent mobilization potential. Data on political status and group
size are taken from the EPR-ETH dataset. Even though the analysis is at the group level,
contextual factor may still affect groups’ choice of terrorism. I therefore control for a
country’s level of democracy (Vreeland 2005) and its GDP per capita (Gleditsch 2002). In
addition, since civil war is frequently associated with higher levels of domestic terrorism
(Findley and Young 2012; Smith and Zeigler 2017), I include a variable for the presence of
civil war to account for possible domestic spillover effect. Civil war data are culled from
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program using a threshold of 25 battle-related deaths. Finally,
I include a cubic polynomial of time since the last terrorist attack to control for temporal
dependence (Carter and Signorino 2010).21
Empirical analysis and discussion
The empirical results for the multilevel models are reported in Table 1. The results are
consistent with the theoretical expectation that an ethnic group is more likely to adopt ter-
rorist tactics if other politically marginalized and geographically proximate ethnic groups
also use similar tactics. More specifically, the coefficient for the spatial lag of terrorism from
excluded groups in neighboring regions, regardless of country, is positive and highly signif-
icant. The coefficient for the spatial lag of terrorism from excluded groups in neighboring
countries is also positive and significant.
The results from the Bayesian spatial probit are reported in Table 2.22 Again, the results
provide strong support for the hypothesis. The coefficient for ρ, the spatial autocorrelation
parameter, is positive and highly significant. This indicates interdependence in ethnic
groups’ decision to adopt terrorist tactics based on shared political exclusion and degree
of geographic proximity.
Turning to the non-spatial effects of political exclusion, while excluded groups are gener-
21In the spatial probit, which is cross-sectional, I control for a group’s history of terrorism
(Appendix B).
22Appendix B describes all the convergence diagnostics performed.
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Table 1: Probability of terrorism for ethnic groups (full sample 1970-2009)
Wy: subnational Wy: subnational Wy: transnational
& transnational & transnational only
Wyt−1 Exclusion×Proximity 1.967∗∗∗ 1.990∗∗∗
(0.300) (0.300)
Wyt−1 Exclusion×Proximity (binary) 2.022∗∗∗
(0.133)
Excluded 0.541∗∗
(0.203)
Discriminated 0.951∗∗∗ 0.863∗∗∗
(0.233) (0.222)
Powerless 0.150 0.168
(0.229) (0.220)
Separatist 1.399∗∗∗ 1.292∗∗
(0.396) (0.399)
Regional Autonomy 0.349 0.425
(0.282) (0.277)
Group size −0.401 −0.472 0.066
(0.591) (0.578) (0.529)
Civil war 1.918∗∗∗ 1.838∗∗∗ 1.694∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.135) (0.133)
Xpolity 0.062∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.043∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
GDPpclog 0.387
∗∗ 0.422∗∗ 0.130
(0.128) (0.130) (0.118)
Constant −8.228∗∗∗ −8.351∗∗∗ −6.061∗∗∗
(1.148) (1.159) (1.027)
σ country 0.432 0.417 0.266
σ groups 0.644 0.599 0.466
Wald χ2 720.33∗∗∗ 735.08∗∗∗ 843.37∗∗∗
Log-Likelihood −2045.73 −2035.66 −1990.40
Number of observations 21949 21949 23500
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 Cubic polynomials not shown in the table.
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ally more likely to resort to terrorism than included ones, when disaggregating exclusion
only Discriminated and Separatist groups are likely to adopt terrorism in the absence of
diffusion. In contrast, in all the models Powerless and Regional autonomy status have no
significant independent effect on the choice of terrorism. These results support the theo-
retical argument that while domestic grievances are important they are often insufficient
on their own to motivate terrorism. In order to spur terrorism such grievances need to be
activated by the terrorist choice of similar groups elsewhere. Interestingly, these results on
the exclusion variables differ from the findings in the civil war literature, where different
forms of exclusion are all strong predictors of civil war onset independent of diffusion effects
(Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013).
Table 2: MCMC Spatial Autoregressive Probit (20000 iterations, burn-in = 2000, diffuse
priors for β parameters and uniform prior for ρ)
1991-1999 2000-2009
ρWy 0.490∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.090)
Discriminated 0.803∗∗∗ 0.728∗∗∗
(0.197) (0.208)
Powerless −0.029 −0.129
(0.162) (0.169)
Separatist 1.385∗∗∗ 0.989∗∗
(0.352) (0.364)
Regional Autonomy −0.066 0.112
(0.213) (0.196)
Group size −0.071 −0.283
(0.293) (0.335)
Civil war 0.147 0.148
(0.156) (0.150)
Xpolity 0.029 0.003
(0.019) (0.017)
GDPpclog −0.110+ −0.037
(0.063) (0.058)
Constant −0.024 −0.466
(0.499) (0.494)
Number of observations 623 630
Note: Coefficients indicate posterior mean. Standard deviation in parentheses
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
22
ll
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
No Terrorism Terrorism
Politically excluded reference groups' tactic
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 te
rro
ris
m
(a)
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Spatial lag of terrorism − Wy (exclusion*proximity)
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 te
rro
ris
m
(b)
Figure 3: Predicted probability of terrorism as a function of reference groups’ terrorism
with 95 percent confidence intervals
I now turn to examine the substantive implications of the models. Figure 3 depicts the
substantive effects from the multilevel model based on estimates from Table 1. Panel
(a) illustrates the effect of terrorism from geographically proximate excluded groups on
the probability that an excluded group also adopts terrorism. The results are shown for
discriminated groups, which face the highest level of political exclusion and are likely to
have very strong domestic motives for violence even in the absence of terrorism from other
groups. The presence of at least one politically excluded ethnic group which used terrorism
in the previous year increases the likelihood of adoption for a discriminated group by a
factor of 5. Conversely, in the absence of diffusion, the probability that a discriminated
group adopts terrorism is much lower and close to zero. Panel (b) shows how an increase
in the proportion of politically excluded and geographically proximate terrorism adopters
affects the likelihood of terrorism for a discriminated group. As the spatial lag increases
from 0 to 0.75, indicating 75 percent terrorism adopters among the reference groups, the
predicted probability of terrorism for a discriminated group increases by a factor of 3. Taken
together, these results reveal a substantial diffusion effect between politically excluded and
geographically proximate ethnic groups.
Marginal effects for the Bayesian spatial probit require more complex calculations but allow
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us to directly estimate the magnitude of terrorism spillovers, or spatial feedbacks, between
groups. Following LeSage and Pace (2009) and LeSage (2013) scalar summary measures
of direct, indirect (i.e. spillover/diffusion), and total effects are presented in Table 3. As
before, I focus specifically on discriminated groups. Marginal effects reflect changes in the
probability of terrorism following an exogenous shock in an independent variable, in this
case discrimination. However, in the spatial probit a shock toward political discrimination
in ethnic group i will not only increase the probability that this group adopts terrorist
tactics but will also affect the probability that other, excluded neighboring groups j resort
to terrorism. The magnitude of this effect depends on the degree of connectivity between
i and j (as defined in the WExclusion×Proximity matrix) and on the strength of spatial
dependence (as measured by the ρ parameter). Discrimination of group i will then have a
direct impact on the probability that group i adopts terrorist tactics as well as an indirect
or spatial spillover impact on all connected groups j. In other words, group i ’s use of
terrorism influences groups j adoption, which feeds back again to group i in a recursive
process. As Table 3 illustrates, the total effects of discrimination are about twice as large
as the direct effects, which means that half the average total probability of terrorism for
a group is actually due to spatial feedbacks from neighboring units, namely to diffusion.
Failing to take into account these diffusion effects through a spatial econometric analysis
can therefore lead to a substantial overestimation of the direct effect of domestic factors
relative to diffusion effects from other units.
Moreover, in all the estimated models two types of exclusion, regional autonomy and
powerless, do not have a significant direct effect on terrorism (i.e. independent of diffusion).
As I further illustrate below, groups in similar circumstances are still subject to diffusion
from other excluded groups and will therefore emulate terrorist tactics even when domestic
incentives alone are insufficient. All in all, these results provide additional, strong evidence
in support of the theory.
The spatial probit allows us to estimate spatial effects for individual groups. Since every
group has a different network of connections, spatial effects vary for each individual group.
Figure 4, panel a, and Figure 5 present disaggregated spatial effects for two ethnic groups,
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Table 3: Average direct, indirect, and total effects from spatial probit 1991-1999 and
2000-2009 (95% credible intervals)
Direct Effects (domestic)
Variable Posterior Mean Lower Bound Upper Bound
Discriminated 1991-99 0.144 0.077 0.218
Discriminated 2000-09 0.121 0.055 0.197
Indirect Effects (diffusion)
Variable Posterior Mean Lower Bound Upper Bound
Discriminated 1991-99 0.130 0.066 0.211
Discriminated 2000-09 0.128 0.059 0.216
Total Effects
Variable Posterior Mean Lower Bound Upper Bound
Discriminated 1991-99 0.274 0.160 0.401
Discriminated 2000-09 0.249 0.124 0.388
namely the Kurds in Turkey and the Sunni in Iraq, and their respective neighborhoods.23
They show how an increase in the probability of terrorism for these groups positively influ-
ences other groups’ adoption of terrorist tactics, with different colors indicating different
probabilities of terrorism, based on the model estimates. Moreover, while panel a in figure
4 presents the predicted probability of terrorism for the Kurds and their neighborhood
based on the model, panel b reports the ethnic groups who actually adopted terrorist tac-
tics in the region during the same time period. Several of the ethnic groups associated
with an increased probability of diffusion-related terrorism based on the model have in fact
adopted terrorist tactics.
I also examine the probability of terrorism for an ethnic group conditional on the actual
adoption of terrorist tactics by another excluded group in the region using the parametric
simulation approach introduced by Franzese, Hays and Cook (2016).24 Focusing specifi-
cally on Sunni groups in Iraq and Syria, I find that the actual use of terrorism by Sunni
organizations in Iraq increases the probability of terrorism for Sunni in Syria by 28 per
23The calculation of these spatial effects is particularly intensive. See Appendix B for
further details.
24See Appendix B. Unfortunately, it is not possible to estimate these effects for all groups
simultaneously because this would require evaluating an n-dimensional integral.
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predictions 1991-1999)
No Terrorism 1991−99
Terrorism 1991−99
(b) Ethnic groups that actually adopted terror-
ist tactics between 1991 and 1999 in the same
region (for comparison with the model predic-
tions)
Figure 4: Spatial effects
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Figure 5: Spatial diffusion of the probability of terrorism following a shock to the political
status of the Sunni (Iraq) towards discrimination (model predictions 2000-2009)
cent. This finding is remarkable also because the political status of the Sunni in Syria
is powerless and all models suggest that a powerless status by itself (i.e. in the absence
of diffusion) is insufficient for spurring the choice of terrorism. Yet, as I argued above,
powerless groups are responsive to, and emulate, the terrorist choice of other, proximate
excluded groups.
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Alternative mechanisms and robustness
To probe the diffusion mechanism and check the robustness of the results I conduct several
additional tests. These tests are summarized in this section and discussed in greater detail
in the supplementary appendix.
First, I have considered a series of competing mechanisms of diffusion. For instance,
terrorist diffusion may be the product of purely non-relational (i.e. non-spatial) channels,
particularly those related with the media. To examine this, I rely on a placebo test and
re-estimate the spatial probit using a connectivity matrix of political exclusion between
groups in the absence of geographic proximity. In this model, the spatial autocorrelation
coefficient ρ is negative and not significant. There is therefore no empirical support for a
global terrorism bandwagon among ethnic groups. This provides further support for the
combined effect of shared exclusion and geographic proximity in fostering emulation.
To further probe the theorized mechanism, I conduct additional tests which examine the
role of political status in shaping groups’ responses to terrorism from geographically prox-
imate groups. Specifically, I interact a spatial lag of terrorism from proximate ethnic
groups with several variables indicating a recipient group’s type and degree of political
exclusion/inclusion. In line with the expectations, as groups become more excluded they
also become increasingly responsive to proximate terrorist examples and thus more likely
to adopt terrorist tactics. In contrast, terrorism from proximate groups that are politi-
cally included has no significant effect on the likelihood that excluded groups emulate this
tactic. Taken together, these results help us rule out the possibility that terrorism arises
from unobserved characteristics shared by geographically proximate groups. This provides
additional evidence that mere geographic proximity is insufficient to generate emulation.
Instead, mutual identification through shared political exclusion is a critical condition for
the diffusion of terrorism between groups.25
The apparent diffusion of terrorism may also result from generic spillover effects from
25I also control for terrorism diffusion through transborder kinship ties. Substantive
conclusions remain unchanged.
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geographically proximate groups or conflicts, or from some omitted, spatially clustered
determinants of terrorism. To control for this, I include a spatial lag of all terrorism in a
group’s neighborhood. Consistent with the theory, this spatial lag is not a significant pre-
dictor of an ethnic group’s adoption of terrorism. To further demonstrate that geographic
proximity is insufficient, on its own, to generate emulation, I introduce two alternative spa-
tial lags of terrorism by geographically proximate non-ethnic organizations, namely leftist
and purely religious groups. Arguably, mutual identification between these organizations
and ethnic ones should be relatively low. In line with the theory, terrorism by geographi-
cally proximate leftist and religious groups is not systematically associated with an ethic
group’s decision to adopt terrorism.
Another mechanism of diffusion, alternative to emulation, is represented by competition be-
tween groups. To control for this I employ a spatial lag which excludes from the neighbors’
list all groups within the same country and only includes groups in neighboring countries.
If group competition does occur it should only affect ethnic groups fighting against the
same government, who may compete to obtain concessions, rather than groups in different
countries which fight against different governments and have different domestic audiences.
The main results hold also with this alternative spatial lag, therefore we can be confident
that the results are not capturing just a competition logic.
Second, I examine the robustness of the results to several alternative specifications of the
spatial lag. Groups may be more likely to adopt terrorism if the number of other terrorism
adopters, rather than their weighted average, increases, or if the reference groups conduct a
greater number of attacks. Therefore, I re-estimate the models with spatial lags capturing
the weighted sum of terrorism from politically excluded and geographically proximate
groups. I also construct an alternative spatial lag which takes into account the magnitude
of terrorist activity from other groups by using a threshold of at least 10 attacks carried out
by each connected group in the previous year, and treating lower terrorist activity in the
neighborhood as no activity at all (i.e. 0). All substantive conclusions remain unchanged.
Third, it is possible that common exposure to observed or unobserved factors that cluster
geographically may drive the results. In this regard, the main results already account for
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unobserved, time-invariant group-specific and country-specific factors which may correlate
with terrorism as well as many strong predictors of terrorism such as civil war. Moreover, to
capture any residual, time-invariant and unobserved factors that may influence terrorism
and potentially also correlate with the spatial lags, I re-estimate the models including
fixed-effects. The coefficients for all the main spatial lag variables remain positive and
statistically significant.
Given the prominence of civil war as an explanation for terrorism, I conduct analyses
with additional controls for the clustering of civil war in a group’s neighborhood and
for the simultaneous presence of domestic and neighboring civil war. I also re-estimate
the models dropping civil war cases. Substantive conclusions remain unchanged and this
indicates that the results are not driven by civil war in the sending or receiving group or by
common exposure to civil war in the broader neighborhood. Moreover, if excluded groups
are spatially clustered, then terrorism may result from the simple clustering of conditions
reflecting domestic motives for terrorism, hence another form of common exposure. To
control for this, I construct a spatially weighted measure of the number of excluded groups
surrounding each ethnic group. The effect of terrorism diffusion remains unchanged and
this helps rule out the possibility of confounding due to spatially correlated group-level
factors.
Fourth, I re-estimate the multilevel models accounting for possible changes in technology
and communication habits over time, which may influence patterns of diffusion. I include a
media density index (Warren 2014) as additional covariate and interact this with the spatial
lag of terrorism. The results provide no evidence of an interactive effect with diffusion
patterns. This is consistent with recent research by Weidmann et al. (2016) which shows
that governments often engage in digital discrimination by depriving of internet access
politically excluded ethnic groups in order to limit their mobilization potential. Finally,
common shocks may produce clusters of terrorism even in the absence of diffusion, hence
I include year-specific intercepts to control for temporal shocks that are common to all
groups in a given year (Neumayer and Plu¨mper 2010). Substantive conclusions remain
unchanged.
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Conclusion
This article shows the importance of considering interdependence between terrorist organi-
zations and strategic emulation as a crucial mechanism leading to the adoption of terrorist
tactics. Despite a burgeoning literature on the causes of domestic terrorism, the vast
majority of existing studies regards terrorist organizations as independent of each other
and the adoption of terrorist tactics as a purely “domestic” decision, rooted in country-
specific or individual-level attributes. Common accounts of domestic terrorism, based on
grievances and/or opportunities for violent mobilization, have mainly assumed these to be
domestically determined. This study focuses instead on how the behavior of other groups
can make group grievances politically salient and shape a group’s perceptions of efficacy by
mitigating the resource, skills, and logistical constraints on the adoption of terrorist tac-
tics. Rather than simply testing for interdependence of terrorist activities between ethnic
groups, I introduce a specific mechanism of diffusion, based on emulation. Such emulation
is conditional on mutual identification based on shared grievances and on perceptions of
terrorist efficacy. These are more likely to occur when sender and receiver groups share a
status of political exclusion and are geographically proximate. All models provide strong
support for the theoretical argument based on diffusion and for the specified conditions
under which terrorist emulation is more likely to occur.
The new dataset introduced in this study has allowed to identify the specific ethnic and
ethnoreligious communities from which terrorist organizations could emerge, and to provide
the first quantitative evidence for the diffusion of domestic terrorism through emulation.
At this point it is difficult to study explicitly religious terrorism because of the lack of
cross-national data on the religious affiliations of terrorist organizations and on societal
groups other than politically relevant ethnic groups. At the same time, this study, and
its mechanism of diffusion, have important implications also for the recent phenomenon of
Jihadist radicalization in Western Europe. A recent study by the Combating Terrorism
Center at West Point–which analyzed the profiles of nearly 2000 European jihadist foreign
fighters who traveled to Iraq and Syria–highlights that “despite the growing attention to
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the role of virtual recruitment, the majority of foreign fighters still relied on some form
of interpersonal connection to make the decision to leave their home country and join the
jihadi movement” (Perliger and Milton 2016, p.26-27). The study adds that ”while virtual
propaganda can provide the initial cognitive opening for adopting the jihadi narrative,
a human connection is necessary to push the individual to actual activism, as well as
for logistical reasons for traveling to a war zone” (p.31). Interestingly, while the individual
backgrounds of European foreign fighters vary considerably, their places of origin are highly
clustered geographically, which further suggests the importance of more traditional forms
of recruitment, local recruitment hubs, and in-person facilitators. This is in line with what
argued in this paper regarding the specific role of direct ties in fostering the adoption of
terrorism. All in all, the role of spatial proximity–in combination with shared grievances–
cannot be discounted, even for jihadist terrorism.
There are also a number of fruitful avenues for future research. For example, understand-
ing how new technologies such as social media reinforce and interact with more traditional
organizational recruitment processes in sparking diffusion is an important topic for future
research. Future studies could also better integrate the role of the government, especially
state repression. Finally, terrorism comes in different forms. This study and its method-
ology can be a stepping stone for future efforts to understand the adoption and diffusion
mechanisms of specific terror tactics, such as IED bombings, vehicle-ramming, and suicide
attacks.
31
References
Asal, Victor H., Hyun Hee Park, R. Karl Rethemeyer and Gary Ackerman. 2016. “With
Friends Like These ... Why Terrorist Organizations Ally.” International Public Manage-
ment Journal 19(1):1–30.
Asal, Victor and Karl R Rethemeyer. 2008. “The Nature of the Beast: Organizational
Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks.” The Journal of Politics 70(2):437–
449.
Asal, Victor, Mitchell Brown and Marcus Schulzke. 2015. ““Kill Them All-Old and Young,
Girls and Women and Little Children”: An Examination of the Organizational Choice
of Targeting Civilians.” Political Science Research and Methods 3(03):589–607.
Bapat, Navin A and Sean Zeigler. 2016. “Terrorism, dynamic commitment problems, and
military conflict.” American Journal of Political Science 60(2):337–351.
Bove, Vincenzo and Tobias Bo¨hmelt. 2016. “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” The
Journal of Politics 78(2):572–588.
Braithwaite, Alex and Quan Li. 2007. “Transnational Terrorism Hot-Spots: Identification
and Impact Evaluation.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 24(4):281–296.
Braithwaite, Alex and Tiffany Chu. Forthcoming. “Civil Conflicts Abroad, Foreign Fight-
ers, and Terrorism at Home.” Journal of Conflict Resolution .
Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan and Eric S. Dickson. 2007. “The Propaganda of the deed:
Terrorism, counterterrorism, and mobilization.” American Journal of Political Science
51(2):365–381.
Buhaug, Halvard and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2008. “Contagion or Confusion? Why
Conflicts Cluster in Space.” International Studies Quarterly 52(2):215–233.
Carter, David B. and Curtis S. Signorino. 2010. “Back to the Future: Modeling Time
Dependence in Binary Data.” Political Analysis 18(3):271–292.
32
Cederman, Lars-Erik, Brian Min and Andreas Wimmer. 2010. “Why do Ethnic Groups
Rebel? New Data and Analysis.” World Politics 62(1):87–119.
Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Halvard Buhaug. 2013. Inequality,
Grievances, and Civil War. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Checkel, Jeffrey T. (Editor). 2013. Transnational Dynamics of Civil War. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Choi, Seung-Whan and James A. Piazza. 2014. “Ethnic Groups, Political Exclusion and
Domestic Terrorism.” Defence and Peace Economics 27(1):37–63.
Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher and Katherine Sawyer. 2017. “Is Self-determination Con-
tagious? A Spatial Analysis of the Spread of Self-Determination Claims.” International
Organization 71(3):585–604.
Cunningham, Kathleen, Marianne Dahl and Anne Fruge´. 2018. “Strategies of resistance:
diversification and diffusion.” American Journal of Political Science 61(3):591–605.
Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler. 2012. The Political Economy of Terrorism. Cambridge,
MA: Cambridge University Press.
Enders, Walter, Todd Sandler and Kusrav Gaibulloev. 2011. “Domestic versus Transna-
tional Terrorism: Data, Decomposition, and Dynamics.” Journal of Peace Research
48(3):319–337.
Findley, Michael G. and Joseph K. Young. 2012. “Terrorism and civil war: A spatial and
temporal approach to a conceptual problem.” Perspectives on Politics 10(2):285–305.
Findley, Michael and Joseph K. Young. 2011. “Terrorism, Democracy, and Credible Com-
mitments.” International Studies Quarterly 55(1):1–22.
Franzese, Robert J. Jr., Jude C. Hays and Scott J. Cook. 2016. “Spatial and Spatio-
Temporal Autoregressive Probit Models of Interdependent Binary Outcomes.” Political
Science Research and Methods 4(1):151–173.
33
Galton, Francis. 1889. “Comment on Edward B. Tylor’s “On a Method of Investigating
the Development of Institutions, Applied to Laws of Marriage and Descent”.” Journal of
the Royal Anthropological Institute 18(3):245–269.
Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2002. “Expanded Trade and GDP Data, 1946-99.” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 46(5):712–724.
Hill, Stuart, Donal Rothchild and Colin Cameron. 1998. “Tactical Information and The
Diffusion of Peaceful Protests”. In The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict. Fear, Dif-
fusion, and Escalation, ed. David Lake and Donald Rothchild. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press pp. 61–88.
Horowitz, Michael C. 2010. “Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case
of Suicide Terrorism.” International Organization 64(1):33–64.
Krueger, Alan. 2007. What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kuran, Timur. 1998. “Ethnic Dissimilation and its International Diffusion”. In The Inter-
national Spread of Ethnic Conflict. Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, ed. David Lake and
Donald Rothchild. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press pp. 35–60.
Lake, David A. and Donald Rothchild. 1998. The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict.
Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
LeSage, James P. 2013. “Bayesian Estimation of Limited Dependent Variable Spatial
Autoregressive Models.” Geographical Analysis 31(1):19–35.
LeSage, James P. and R. Kelley Pace. 2009. Introduction to Spatial Econometrics. Boca
Raton, FL: CRC Press/Taylor and Francis.
Maves, Jessica and Alex Braithwaite. 2013. “Autocratic Institutions and Civil Conflict
Contagion.” The Journal of Politics 75(2):478–490.
34
Metternich, Nils W., Shahryar Minhas and Michael D. Ward. 2015. “Firewall? Or Wall on
Fire? A Unified Framework of Conflict Contagion and the Role of Ethnic Exclusion.”
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming .
Midlarsky, Manus, Martha Crenshaw and Fumihiko Yoshida. 1980. “Why Violence Spreads.
The Contagion of International Terrorism.” International Studies Quarterly 24(2):262–
298.
Nemeth, Stephen C., Jacob A. Mauslein and Craig Stapley. 2014. “The Primacy of the
Local: Identifying Terrorist Hot Spots Using Geographic Information Systems.” The
Journal of Politics 76(2):304–317.
Neumayer, Erik and Thomas Plu¨mper. 2010. “Galton’s Problem and Contagion in Inter-
national Terrorism along Civilizational Lines.” Conflict Management and Peace Science
27(4):308–325.
Pape, Robert A. 2003. “The strategic logic of suicide terrorism.”American Political Science
Review 97(3):343–361.
Perliger, Arie and Daniel Milton. 2016. “From Cradle to Grave: The Lifecycle of Foreign
Fighters in Iraq and Syria.” Report – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point .
Sageman, Marc. 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University of
Pennsylvania Press.
Schmidt, Alex P. 2016. “Links between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration.” Report
– International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague .
Shipan, Charles R. and Craig Volden. 2008. “The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion.” Amer-
ican Journal of Political Science 52(4):840–857.
Simmons, Beth A. and Zachary Elkins. 2004. “The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy
Diffusion in the International Political Economy.” American Political Science Review
98(1):171–189.
35
Simmons, Beth, Frank A. Dobbin and Geoffrey Garrett. 2008. The Global Diffusion of
Markets and Democracy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, Meagan and Sean M. Zeigler. 2017. “Terrorism before and after 9/11 - a more
dangerous world?” Research & Politics 4(4).
Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. New York, NY: McGrow Hill.
Tversky, Amos and David Kahneman. 1974. “Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases.” Science 185(4157):1124–1131.
Vreeland, James Raymond. 2005. “A Problem with Polity: Unpacking Anocracy.”. Type-
script, Department of Political Science, Yale University.
Warren, T. Camber. 2014. “Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the
Production of State Sovereignty.” International Organization 68(1):111–141.
Weidmann, Nils B., Suso Benitez-Baleato, Philipp Hunziker, Eduard Glatz and Xenofontas
Dimitropoulos. 2016. “Digital Discrimination: Political Bias in Internet Service Provision
across Ethnic Groups.” Science 353(64):1151–1154.
Wilhelm, Stefan and Miguel Godinho de Matos. 2013. “Estimating Spatial Probit Models
in R.” The R Journal 5(1):130–143.
Wucherpfennig, Julian, Nils B. Weidmann, Luc Girardin, Lars-Erik Cederman and Andreas
Wimmer. 2011. “Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups across Space and Time: Introducing
the GeoEPR Dataset.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 28(5):423–437.
Wucherpfennig, Julian, Nils Metternich, Lars-Erik Cederman and Kristian Skrede Gled-
itsch. 2012. “Ethnicity, the State and the Duration of Civil War.”World Politics 64(1):79–
115.
36
